In many situations there is a potential for con ‡ict both within and between groups. Examples include wars and civil wars and distributional con ‡ict in multitiered organizations like federal states or big companies. This paper models such situations with a logistic technology of con ‡ict. If individuals decide simultaneously and independently about the amount of internal con ‡ict, external con ‡ict and production, there is typically either only internal con ‡ict, or only external con ‡ict -but not both. If each group decides collectively how much each member has to put into the external con ‡ict before the members individually decide on the amounts put into the internal con ‡ict and production, groups choose su¢ ciently high external con ‡ict in order to avoid internal con ‡ict. This is a model of the "diversionary use of force". We also study the optimal number of groups.
Introduction
Many political and economic situations have a potential for con ‡ict both within and between groups. Military con ‡icts, wars and civil wars often involve these two layers of con ‡ict. 1 Rent-seeking or appropriative activities in multi-tiered organizations like federal states, …rms or universities are other examples. 2 As William Sumner stated almost 100 years ago, there seems to be a negative correlation between con ‡icts within a group and con ‡ict between groups. 3 Ralf Dahrendor¤ even called this a law of the social sciences. 4 This group cohesion e¤ect has been the subject of a large literature in the social sciences. There is support for the group cohesion e¤ect from sociology, 1 For example, in the Civil War in Spain the two …ghting sides or 'groups'consisted of several sub-groups: the old government, the Anarchists, the Communists and others on the left; the Falange with two fractions, the Royalists and the Carlists on the right. On each side, these forces joined to …ght against their common enemy; however, there were also severe …ghts within each of the camps. In the May risings in Barcelona 1937, …ghting between Anarchists, Trotskyists, and Communists lead to several hundred deaths. On a smaller scale in April 1937 gun battles took place in Salamanca among the two wings of the Falange. See Beevor (2001) , Chapter XIX. 2 See Wärneryd (1998) on rent-seeking in federal states; Müller and Wärneryd (2001) on con ‡icts between inside and outside owners of a company; and Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd (2002) on distributional con ‡ict within organizations. See also Konrad (2004) . In addition, Glazer (2002) stresses the importance of internal and external rent-seeking in organizations. See also Gar…nkel (1994) for a study of interrelations between domestic politics and international con ‡ict. 3 Similar points were observed much earlier by chroniclers of the Italian city republics, as Waley (1988, p. 117) reports: "Even in the eleventh century Milanese chroniclers had remarked of their fellow citizens that 'when they lack external adversaries they turn their hatred against each other'. This well-founded observation was to become a commonplace for other cities too. Florence was built under the signs of Aries and Mars, says Malispini: 'our ancestors were always …ghting battles and wars and when they had no other opponent they fought among themselves'". 4 "It appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased internal coherence." Dahrendorf (1964), p. 58, cited after Levy (1989) , p. 261. psychology, and anthropology. 5 A recent case in point was noted by The Economist: George W. Bush had "a year of stratospheric popularity after the attacks of September 11th 2001 and a shorter gust of support after the war began in Iraq" 6 .
This paper is one of the …rst studies of an economic model of con ‡ict for such situations with simultaneous con ‡icts at di¤erent levels. Economic models of con ‡ict start with the fact that property rights are not always completely enforced. Thus individuals can, and do, engage in activities that are not productive -they do not increase the size of the pie but instead are aimed at increasing one's share of the pie. 7 Each player decides how to allocate his resources to three kinds of activities: to production, to rentseeking (or …ghting) for one's own group, and to rent-seeking (or …ghting) within one's own group. We assume that the technology of con ‡ict is given by a logistic or di¤erence form contest success function. The logistic technology of con ‡ict has been used frequently in the literature. Skaperdas (1996) gives an axiomatic foundation. Hirshleifer (1991) argues that the logistic contest success function is in line with a number of stylized facts of warfare. We show that in our model there is an extreme form of the group cohesion e¤ect: in equilibrium there is con ‡ict either between or within groups, but -except for a nongeneric case -not both at the same time. This result is due to the property of di¤erence form contest success functions that, in a symmetric situation where all players choose the same rent-seeking e¤orts, the marginal returns to rent-seeking are independent of the total amount of rent-seeking. Thus, if marginal returns to intra-group rent-seeking are higher than those to inter-group rent-seeking, there is only internal con ‡ict, and vice versa. Changes in the environment can switch the equilibrium from con ‡ict between groups and peace within groups to con ‡ict only within groups and peace between groups, and vice versa.
In the basic model, we assume that all players decide simultaneously and 5 For example, Stein concludes in his excellent survey of the literature up to the mid 1970s that, under some conditions, "external con ‡ict does increase internal cohesion" (1976, p. 165). Dion (1979) and Fisher (1990) come to similar conclusions in their surveys of the literature. See Bornstein (2003) for a survey of related experimental work. 6 "On the back foot", June 23rd 2005. 7 Such activities have been called 'appropriation' (Grossman 1994) , 'rent-seeking'(Tullock 1980), 'power seeking' (Rajan and Zingales 2000) , 'in ‡uence activities' (Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1990) , 'coercive activities' (Skaperdas 1992 ) and simply 'stealing'or '…ghting' (Hirshleifer 1988 , and his essays collected in Hirshleifer 2001) in the literature.
independently how to allocate their resources to the three kinds of activity. This is a realistic description in situations with somewhat amorphous con ‡icts, like rent-seeking in organizations, or chaotic situations within civil wars. However, in many applications, the decision about external con ‡icts has a di¤erent character than that over internal con ‡icts. For example, decisions about inter-state wars are usually taken by some political process, e.g. by a leader, or by an elected government or parliament and not by the subjects individually. We model this in an extension to the basic model where we assume that each group …rst decides how many resources each group member has to put in the external con ‡ict before the individuals decide about the allocation of their remaining resources to internal …ghting and production. The outcome is quite di¤erent: groups commit to levels of external con ‡ict that are su¢ ciently high to prevent any internal con ‡ict occurring.
Thus, we propose a model for the old idea that external con ‡ict is used to prevent internal con ‡ict. This "diversionary theory of war" dates back to Jean Bodin (1556) ("the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to …nd an enemy against whom they can make common cause" (Six Books of the Commonwealth, translated by M. J. Tooley 1955, Book V Chap. V)). Jonathan Swift (1720) ("Wise princes …nd it necessary to have wars abroad to keep peace at home" 8 ) and William Shakespeare (1591) ("Be it thy course to busy giddy minds / With foreign quarrels", Henry IV Part II, Act 4 Scene 5) expressed similar ideas. The idea can be found in many historical writings and in case studies of speci…c wars (see e.g. Joll (1999) on Germany and others in World War I , and Levy and Vakili (1992) on Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War) 9 .
Two important contributions are those of Orphanides (1995, 2001) who explain the occurrence of diversionary wars by the voters'incomplete information about the abilities of a leader. 10 A leader with a reelection 8 The quote is from The History of Martin, A digression on the nature usefulness & necessity of wars and quarels. See Swift (1720 Swift ( [1958 ), p. 305. There are some doubts whether Swift is indeed the author. 9 A list of classic cases is given by Levy and Vakili (1992) , Footnote 5 on p. 138. In the quantitative empirical work on the issue, however, …ndings are mixed and no consensus has emerged. See Levy (1989) and Levy (1998) 10 See also Smith (1996) .
motive and a bad internal performance (say, high unemployment or in ‡ation) may wish to engage in external war in order to convince the voters of his high military abilities. Contrary to Hess and Orphanides, we assume complete information and show that there is nevertheless a possibility of diversionary wars. Our model also contributes to the explanation of the emergence of several internal wars after the demise of the cold war. The end of the superpower confrontation diminished incentives to engage in external con ‡ict, because of less pronounced ideological di¤erences between the two blocks and better collaboration in international organizations. It also lowered the ability of the former Eastern Block members to commit themselves to a level of external con ‡ict su¢ cient to eliminate internal con ‡icts. As one would expect from our model, internal con ‡icts ‡ared up; the wars in the Balkans, in Chechnya, Georgia, and Moldova are cases in point.
We also derive normative implications for the optimal design of an organization that is ridden by potential con ‡ict both between and within its groups. For a given size of the organization, how many groups should there be? With only one group, there is obviously only intra-group con ‡ict. Increasing the number of groups decreases the amount of con ‡ict, until at some point con- ‡ict within groups ceases and con ‡icts between the groups start. After that point, a further increase in the number of groups leads to more con ‡ict and to less production in equilibrium. We show that, if the technology of con ‡ict is as decisive in the inter-group con ‡ict as it is in the intra-group con ‡ict, then the organization should have as many groups as there are individuals in each group. If the inter-group con ‡ict is more decisive, the optimal number of groups is smaller; and vice versa: if the intra-group con ‡ict is more decisive, there should be more groups.
The paper adds to the literature on the trade-o¤ between production and appropriation. Important contributions are Skaperdas (1992) , Grossman (1991 Grossman ( , 1994 , Grossman and Kim (1995) and Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( , 2001 ; an important recent contribution is Baker (2003) . See Hirshleifer (1995) and Skaperdas (2003) for surveys. In a companion paper, one of us has studied simultaneous inter-and intra-group con ‡ict with a ratio form con ‡ict technology (Münster 2005) . However, Münster (2005) does not look at the case where groups commit to external con ‡ict before individuals decide on production and internal con ‡ict, and hence does not study the diversionary use of force. Moreover, with the ratio form technology, equilibria are always characterized by simultaneous con ‡icts both between and within groups. In addition, the normative implications di¤er. Most importantly, with the ratio type of technology and equally decisive contests between and within groups, the number of groups has no in ‡uence on total con ‡ict and production. This is in stark contrast to the …ndings for the logistic or di¤erence form contest technology discussed in this paper.
Our paper is also related to the literature on collective rent-seeking. Early contributions (Nitzan 1991 ) assumed that the distribution within a group is given by some sharing rule which might depend on the inter-group rentseeking e¤orts, but did not model the internal con ‡ict explicitly. Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) study a two stage rent-seeking game where in the …rst stage, individuals decide how much to invest in inter-group rent-seeking, and in the second stage there is internal rent-seeking. Wärneryd (1998) applies a similar model to rent-seeking in federal states, arguing that a federal state may actually lead to less rent-seeking than a centralized state, although it adds one additional layer of con ‡ict. Müller and Wärneryd (2001) have a related result on inside versus outside ownership; and Inderst, Müller, and Wärneryd (2002) apply this logic to the allocation of scarce resources within a …rm. Konrad and Leininger (2005) present a model where a group can resolve its collective action problem in the supply of inter-group rent-seeking e¤ort because the ensuing intra-group rent-seeking contest has multiple equilibria. In contrast to our paper, none of these papers studies simultaneous interand intra-group con ‡icts, or the case where groups collectively decide about how much every member must put into the inter-group con ‡ict. In addition, in these rent-seeking models, the size of the contested rent is usually assumed to be exogenous, whereas our model is concerned with the trade-o¤ between production and rent-seeking.
Several papers study the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of external con ‡ict. Spolaore (2003, 2005 ) study the relation between the size of countries and the incidence of international war. They argue that the equilibrium size of a country depends on the importance of international war. Better de…ned international property rights may lead to smaller countries and hence a higher number of countries. This has the e¤ect that the number of international con ‡icts may actually increase. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) focus on international wars and abstract from internal con ‡icts once a country is formed. Our analysis complements theirs, since we focus explicitly on the occurrence of internal as well as international con ‡icts. On the other hand, we abstract from issues of country formation of secession which are at the center of their analysis. Gar…nkel (2004) looks at how an increased ex-ternal risk in ‡uences into internal con ‡ict. However, she does not explicitly model the behavior of the competing groups in an external con ‡ict.
Section 2 presents the basic model of simultaneous inter-and intra-group con ‡icts, section 3 studies its equilibria. Section 4 deals with the case where the individuals collectively decide about the amount of inter-group con ‡ict before engaging in production and internal con ‡ict. Here we expose the diversionary use of force argument in our model. Section 5 deals with the normative issues of the optimal number and size of groups. Section 6 concludes. The appendix collects some of the longer proofs.
The model
There are n identical individuals who are divided into G groups of equal size m = n=G. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time. In the basic model, an individual i in group g has three choice variables: productive e¤ort e ig , intra-group rent-seeking e¤ort x ig and inter-group rent-seeking e¤ort y ig . The individuals simultaneously and independently decide how to allocate their resources to these three activities. 11 The budget constraints of the individuals are e ig + x ig + y ig = 1:
Output is given by the production function
where f (0) = 0 12 and f 0 (z) > 0 for all z 0: In addition, we assume that f is log-concave. Although we focus the discussion below on the opportunity costs of …ghting, this production function also captures potential other negative e¤ects, for example when …ghting destroys output, as long as the amount of destruction depends on the sum of …ghting. To see this, consider the 11 For some applications it is more appropriate to assume that the amount of external con ‡ict is chosen collectively, by some political process, before the individuals engage in production and internal con ‡icts. We model this in section 4. 12 Often …ghting is not only over today's output, but also over (say) land, natural resources, or valuable items produced in the past. We could capture this by assuming f (0) > 0: In this case, there are additional corner solutions where there is only …ghting, but the main results below carry over. following production function
where F is increasing in its …rst argument and decreasing in its second. Using the budget constraints we can write
The distribution of output depends on the rent-seeking activities. The share that goes to group g is denoted by p g which is a function of all the inter-group rent-seeking activities. Thus the amount that group g gets is p g q. From that amount, individual i in group g gets the share r ig which depends on the intra-group rent-seeking activities of the members of group g. The payo¤ of individual i in group g thus is
We assume a logistic technology of con ‡ict. Individual i in group g gets the fraction
The parameter a > 0 describes the decisiveness of the intra-group contest. If a is small, the rent-seeking e¤orts will have little in ‡uence on the division of output, whereas if a ! 1 then small di¤erences in rent-seeking e¤orts are decisive. We think of a being determined by both technological factors (for example police technology) and institutional factors pertaining to the security of property within a group. Similarly, group g gets the fraction
The parameter b > 0 describes the decisiveness of the inter-group contest. Like a; this is determined by technological and institutional factors. However, b may di¤er from a since both the technology and the relevant institutions di¤er in contests between groups from those in contests within groups. For example, a higher importance of international institutions and methods of peaceful international con ‡ict resolution would mean that there is a lower incentive to engage in international …ghting, which can be captured by a lower b in our model. Similarly, the introduction of new means in intergroup con ‡icts (as the use of airplanes in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001) can be understood as a higher decisiveness of inter-group con ‡ict. The logistic contest success function is continuous, even when all contestants choose zero rent-seeking. This leads to a possibility of corner solutions where some individuals choose zero rent-seeking e¤ort. Moreover, adding a constant to all the rent-seeking e¤orts does not change the shares of the contestants. The shares thus depend only on the di¤erence of the rentseeking e¤orts; the logistic contest success function is therefore also known as the di¤erence form technology of con ‡ict. 13 Since the game is completely symmetric, we will focus on symmetric equilibria. The game also has asymmetric equilibria, but these have similar properties.
3 What type of con ‡ict?
Use the budget constraint to eliminate e ig from the objective function and write
(1 x jk y jk ) ! :
(1)
Individual i in group g solves the following maximization problem max
With the logistic con ‡ict technology, an individual's share of total output 13 This is the main property of the logistic contest success function that we will use below; it corresponds to Axiom A7 in the axiomatization of contest success functions by Skaperdas (1996) . We could allow for more general di¤erence form contest success functions, dropping Axioms A4 and A5 in Skaperdas (1996) , without a¤ecting our main results.
is always strictly positive: r ig p g > 0. Thus, each individual can guarantee himself a strictly positive utility by choosing strictly positive productive effort; hence in any equilibrium, output is strictly positive. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, the constraint x ig + y ig 1 is not binding.
The objective function is concavi…able (we show in appendix A1 that ln u ig is strictly concave in (x ig ; y ig )). Moreover, the constraint set is convex. Therefore, the following …rst order conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient for a maximum:
@u ig @y ig 0; y ig 0; y ig @u ig @y ig = 0:
The …rst inequality in (2) can be expressed as
where (z) := f 0 (z) =f (z) : Note that, by our assumption that f is logconcave; 0 (z) < 0 and an inverse function 1 exists. Focussing on a symmetric situation where x jk = x and y jk = y for all individuals j and groups k, we get a m 1 m (n (1 x y)) :
Inequality (4) describes the trade-o¤ between production and intra-group rent-seeking in a symmetric equilibrium. If it holds with strict inequality, then x must be zero: the marginal bene…t of intra-group rent-seeking is smaller than the opportunity cost of foregone production. The …rst inequality in (3) gives us
Inequality (5) describes the trade-o¤ between production and inter-group rent-seeking in a symmetric equilibrium. If it holds with strict inequality, then y must be zero, because the marginal bene…t of inter-group rent-seeking is smaller than the opportunity cost of foregone production. There are four cases to consider. These are given in de…nition 1 below and illustrated in …gure 1.
and …nally case SPECIAL by
Which of these cases we are in, depends on the decisiveness of internal and external con ‡icts, on the number and size of the groups, and on the production technology. We begin with case NO, where the opportunity cost of rent-seeking in terms of forgone production are prohibitively high.
Lemma 1 In case NO, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where all e¤ort is put into production: e = 1 and x = y = 0:
Proof. To see that this is an equilibrium, note that the …rst order conditions hold at (x; y) = (0; 0). To show uniqueness, suppose, to the contrary, that (x 0 ; y 0 ) 6 = (0; 0) is an equilibrium. Since (n (1 x y)) in increasing in x and in y; it follows from condition (NO) that both (4) and (5) must hold with strict inequality. This implies that x 0 = y 0 = 0, a contradiction. Lemma 1 describes case NO where property is relatively secure and thus the parameters a and b are relatively small. In this case, the individuals do not engage in rent-seeking activities. However, if inequality (NO) does not hold, there will be rent-seeking in equilibrium. Typically, there is con ‡ict only within groups, or only between groups -but not both. For example, if a is big relative to b; then there will be rent-seeking within the groups, and no rent-seeking between groups; this is case INTRA dealt with in lemma 2 below. On the other hand, if b is big relative to a; then there is only inter-group rent-seeking; this is case INTER dealt with in lemma 3.
Lemma 2
In case INTRA, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where there is no rent-seeking between groups (y = 0): Intra-group rent-seeking x 2 (0; 1) is given by
and productive e¤ort is e = 1 x:
Proof. First note that (6) de…nes a unique x: Second, x > 0 by (INTRA). Third, x < 1 since lim z!0 (z) = 1: Thus no constraints are violated. Existence follows from the fact that the …rst order conditions hold. For uniqueness, we proceed in four steps.
1. As argued above, in any equilibrium e > 0 and hence x + y < 1.
2. x = y = 0 is not an equilibrium, since then (4) is violated.
3. Suppose that y > 0 in equilibrium. This implies that (5) holds with equality. Together with (INTRA), this contradicts (4).
4. It follows from steps 1 to 3 that in equilibrium we have 0 = y < x < 1. Hence (4) holds with equality. This implies (6) .
Lemma 3
In case INTER, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where there is no intra-group rent-seeking (x = 0): Inter-group rent-seeking y 2 (0; 1) is determined by b G 1 G = (n (1 y)) ;
and productive e¤ort is e = 1 y:
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 2. Finally, we have to consider case SPECIAL. Although this is a nongeneric case (it corresponds to the bold line in …gure 1), it will turn out to be interesting from a normative point of view in section 5. In case SPECIAL, (4) and (5) are no longer independent. This leads to a multiplicity of symmetric equilibria.
Lemma 4 In case SPECIAL, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria where x + y is determined by
and e = 1 x y 2 (0; 1) :
Proof. The …rst order conditions hold at all e; x and y satisfying (8) .
Note that all the equilibria described in lemma 4 have the same amount of production. The following proposition sums up the discussion and gives some comparative statics.
Proposition 1 i) Only in the nongeneric case SPECIAL there is con ‡ict both within and between groups. Typically, if there is con ‡ict at all, it takes place either within groups, or between groups, but not both. ii) Con ‡ict within groups is more likely if con ‡icts within groups are very decisive (a is large) and the number of groups G is small, holding the n constant. When con ‡ict within groups occurs, then its intensity is increasing in a and decreasing in G: iii) Con ‡ict between groups is more likely if con ‡icts between groups are very decisive (b is large) and G is large, holding the n constant. When con ‡ict between groups occurs, its intensity is increasing in b and in G:
Proof. Part i) is clear from lemmas 1-4. For part ii), note that (m 1) =m (n G) =n since n mG: Thus, holding n constant, (m 1) =m decreases in G: The result follows from 0 (z) < 0 and lemma 2. Similarly, part iii) follows from lemma 3.
In the model we have an extreme form of the group cohesion e¤ect: there is either con ‡ict within or between groups. In particular, a change in the technology of con ‡ict can change the situation from external con ‡ict with internal peace to internal con ‡ict with external peace. This may contribute to an explanation of several civil wars that occurred after the end of the cold war. Diminished ideological di¤erences, and better possibilities for peaceful cooperation in international organizations all meant that the bene…ts from engaging in external con ‡ict between the former two blocks were lowered. In terms of the model, b went down. Accordingly, the equilibrium switched to peace between the two former blocks, but then with internal con ‡icts.
The diversionary use of force
As we argued in the introduction, decisions about external con ‡ict are often taken by some political process which is di¤erent from the simultaneous and independent optimization studied above in the basic version of our model. Therefore, in this section we study what happens if the amount of external con ‡ict is chosen collectively, by some political process, before the individuals engage in production and internal con ‡icts. To be more precise, we propose the following two stage game:
1. Each group decides about the amount y g that each group member has to put into the external con ‡ict.
2. After observing all the decisions taken in stage 1, individuals simultaneously and independently decide how to allocate their remaining resources to production and internal …ghting. That is, individual i in group g chooses x ig and e ig such that x ig + e ig = 1 y g :
There are several ways to think of the political decision process in stage 1. In the model these all lead to the same result. One of the individuals in a group might be a dictator who chooses y g in order to maximize his utility. Or each group might delegate the decision right to one of its members, a "politician" who has to decide about the amount of resources to put into external con ‡ict. Finally, a group might just vote: due to the assumption of identical individuals, the decision is unanimous.
We solve the game by backward induction. Section 4.1 studies the equilibrium of the subgames in stage 2 for all possible choices taken in stage 1. In section 4.2 we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The second stage: internal …ghting
In the second stage individuals choose the e¤ort they put into intra-group rent-seeking and production. In their choices they are constrained by the amount of resources that has already been devoted to the external con ‡ict in the …rst stage. Denote the objective function of individual i in group g on the second stage by v ig ; and let x ig denote the vector of all the x jk except x ig : In stage 2, individual i in group g maximizes the following over x ig v ig (x ig ; x ig ; y 1 ; :::
This is a concavi…able objective function with a convex constraint set. In a solution, one of the following …rst order conditions has to hold:
@v ig @x ig 0; x ig = 0 or (9) @v ig @x ig = 0; x ig 2 (0; 1 y g ) or
@v ig @x ig 0; x ig = 1 y g :
Moreover, if one of these conditions holds, this is su¢ cient for a maximum. These optimality conditions are similar to line (2) above, with the additional constraint that x ig cannot be bigger than 1 y g : Since groups may have chosen di¤erent amounts of external …ghting in the …rst stage, we cannot assume a symmetric solution where all the x ig s are equal. This also means that for some individuals the constraint that internal …ghting cannot exceed 1 y g might be binding; line (11) takes this into account. Calculating the derivative, we …nd that Proof. See appendix A2.
To see the logic behind this, consider the case where players 1 and 2 in a group g choose to engage in both internal con ‡ict and production. Then the …rst order conditions imply that @r 1g @x 1g
and this, in turn, implies that x 1g = x 2g : Of course, we have to check for corner solutions as well; but here basically the same logic goes through. Using within-group symmetry, line (12) simpli…es to @v ig @x ig 8 < :
As one can imagine from our analysis in the last section, there are two cases to consider. There is a threshold which depends on the choices in the …rst stage, such that if a is below the threshold, there is no internal …ghting and only production in stage 2. Lemma 6 below makes this precise. On the other hand, if a is bigger than the threshold, then there is internal con ‡ict (see lemma 7 below).
then there exists a unique equilibrium of the subgames in stage 2 with x ig = 0 for all individuals i and groups g: Payo¤s are
Proof. See appendix A3.
To gain some intuition, observe that (14) is likely to hold if there has been a lot of external …ghting in stage 1. Hence there are few resources left over in stage 2. Even if all the remaining resources are allocated to production, the marginal incentives to produce are higher than the marginal incentives to engage in internal con ‡ict. Thus, there is no internal …ghting.
Lemma 7 If inequality (14) does not hold, then in any equilibrium of the subgames in stage 2 there is internal …ghting. The total amount of internal …ghting is determined by
Payo¤s in all equilibria are
Proof. See appendix A4. Lemma 7 describes the case where there was relatively little …ghting in the …rst stage. Here, if all the remaining resources were allocated to production, the marginal incentives to …ght internally would be higher than the marginal incentives to produce. Thus, there is some internal …ghting going on, the amount being determined by the trade-o¤ between internal …ghting and production. Since expression (16) only determines the total amount of internal …ghting, the equilibrium will typically be not unique. All equilibria, however, are payo¤ equivalent.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium utilities of the subgames in the second stage is that, in the case with internal …ghting (lemma 6), equilibrium production does not depend on the choices made in the …rst stage. If there are more resources left over from the …rst stage, this simply leads to more internal con ‡ict in the second stage. Conversely, increasing y g gives groups g a higher share p g of output, without decreasing production. Of course, this is no longer true once there is so much external …ghting in stage 1 that (14) holds.
The …rst stage: external …ghting
To analyze the equilibrium choices of the …rst stage, we again have to consider the cases distinguished in de…nition 1. In case NO, where both a and b are relatively small, there will be no con ‡ict at all, and y g = 0 for all groups. Moreover, in case INTER where b is relatively big, the equilibrium amount of inter-group con ‡ict will be determined by a trade o¤ between inter-group rent-seeking and production, exactly as in lemma 3 above. Given this amount of inter-group …ghting, there is no internal con ‡ict in stage 2.
The case INTRA where a is relatively big is di¤erent, however. In this case, the equilibrium amount of inter-group con ‡ict is determined by the condition that there is no internal con ‡ict in the second stage. That is, P y k is determined such that (14) holds with equality. Again we focus on symmetric equilibria where y 1 = ::: = y G =: y. Proposition 2 sums up the results.
Proposition 2 Suppose groups commit to the amount of external …ghting that each individual has to put into the inter-group con ‡ict, before individuals decide on the allocation of their remaining resources to internal con ‡ict and production. There is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, where the equilibrium choices of external …ghting are as follows. In case NO, y 1 = ::: = y G = 0. In case INTRA, y is given by a (m 1) m = (n (1 y)) :
In the cases INTER and SPECIAL, y is given by equation (7) in lemma 3. In any case, there is no internal …ghting on the equilibrium path.
Proof. See appendix A5. The basic insight behind proposition 2 is as follows. In the …rst stage, the groups will spend enough on the external con ‡ict in order to ensure that there is no internal …ghting. This can be seen directly from equation (17): as long as P y k is small enough such that we are in the case with internal …ghting described in lemma 6, utility of a group g is strictly increasing in y g . Thus, on the equilibrium path there is no internal …ghting. Rather, groups use the external con ‡ict in order to get rid of their internal quarrels. In case INTRA, the groups choose their inter-group …ghting such that there is no internal con ‡ict. Quite literally, war with outsiders makes peace inside! An interesting implication is that in case INTRA, how much external …ghting occurs depends on the technology of internal con ‡ict:
Corollary 1 In case INTRA, an increase in internal insecurity a leads to more external …ghting y; while changes in external insecurity b do not a¤ect the amount of external …ghting.
Proof. From (18) .
Notice that in case INTRA, groups start …ghting against each other even if b is very small. In the extreme case where b = 0; external …ghting has no in ‡uence on the share of a group and thus groups do not have an appropriation motive for external …ghting. Nevertheless, even if b = 0 there is a subgame perfect equilibrium where groups …ght enough to prevent internal con ‡ict. There are additional equilibria with internal …ghting as well in this case; they disappear as soon as b is strictly positive, however small. This is thus a model of the "diversionary use of force".
In optimum both types of con ‡ict
This section turns to the normative implications of the model. In particular, how many groups should an organization have, if it is ridden with potential con ‡ict both within and between its groups? It turns out that the answer to this question does not depend on whether groups can commit to their external …ghting before deciding on internal …ghting and production. As the following corollary shows, equilibrium utility is identical in both versions of the model. In the cases INTER and SPECIAL, equilibrium utility equals
Proof. Case NO: follows directly from lemma 1 and proposition 2 (case NO), respectively. Case INTRA: from lemma 2 and proposition 2 (case INTRA), respectively, it follows that total productive e¤ort is
Inserting this in the utility function gives the result. Case INTER: Similarly from lemmas 3 and 4, and proposition 2 (case INTER).
As long as (INTRA) holds, productive e¤ort is increasing in the number of groups holding constant the size n of the organization. 14 Hence equilibrium utility is increasing. But after some point, we switch to case INTER, and here productive e¤ort and equilibrium utility are decreasing in the number of groups. Thus, in order to minimize con ‡ict, the organization should be designed such that we are in case SPECIAL, where there are simultaneous inter-and intra-group con ‡icts. In this sense, it is optimal to have both types of con ‡ict. Proposition 3 makes this precise.
Proposition 3 For given n; an optimal number of groups is given by (ignoring integer problems)
Proof. If a (m 1) =m a (n G) =n > b (G 1) =G; equilibrium utility is weakly increasing in G by Corollary 2 and the fact that 1 is decreasing. On the other hand, if a (n G) =n < b (G 1) =G; equilibrium utility is weakly decreasing in G: Thus an optimal G solves a n G n = b G 1 G : 14 Recall that since n mG; we have (m 1) =m (n G) =G which is decreasing in G: In addition, is decreasing, thus 1 is decreasing as well.
Equation (19) gives a root of (20) . Note that G > 0 which is obvious if a b and follows, if a < b, from
A similar consideration shows that the second root of (20) is negative. The optimal number of groups is not necessarily unique. The number given in the proposition is always welfare maximizing. However, if the technology is very productive, di¤erent organizational structures can lead to zero con ‡ict in equilibrium and thus be optimal. This should be kept in mind in the discussion below.
The optimal number of groups has the following properties. First, typically the extreme cases G = 1 and G = n will not be optimal -this follows directly from equation (20) . Note that in the model the production technology gives no reason for dividing individuals in di¤erent groups. The reason for having several groups comes only from the rent-seeking activities. The …ndings are in sharp contrast to the case of a ratio type contest success function explored in Münster (2005) where the optimal number of groups is either 1 or n:
Second, if a = b; then G = p n: Since n mG; this means that there should be as many groups as there are individuals in any group.
Third, as one should expect, G is increasing in a and decreasing in b: (This is also true in a bang-bang sense in the case with a ratio-type contest success function.)
Fourth, G is increasing in n, when the total number of individuals is increasing the optimal number of groups also increases.
Fifth, the gains due to having the right structure can be quite substantial. In order to measure the gains, we compare the worst possible number of groups with the best possible number of groups, and calculate the percentage increase in productive e¤ort. For simplicity, consider the case where a = b and the production function has a constant elasticity form, f (z) = z h where h > 0 is a returns to scale parameter. Here, with an optimal number of groups, productive e¤ort of an individual is h= (b (n p n)) : On the other hand, the worst possible structure of the organization would be to have only one group, or equivalently n groups. In this case, productive e¤ort is h= (b (n 1)) : Changing from the worst situation to the optimal number of groups, we …nd that the e¤ort increases by the factor 1 + 1= p n: The corresponding increase in output depends on returns to scale, output increases by the factor 1 + 1 p n h : The gains can be quite substantial; e.g. if n = 100; productive e¤ort increases by 10%: The gains are decreasing in n: They are maximal at n = 4 (for smaller n there is no way to make groups of equal size), where productive e¤ort increases by 50%.
Conclusion
Many situations in economics and politics share the common structure that individual players belong to groups, and there is a potential for con ‡icts both within and between the groups. Examples include wars and civil wars as well as rent-seeking in multi-tiered organizations such as federal states, …rms, or universities. This paper studies the interdependence of internal con ‡ict, external con ‡ict, and production. We set up an economic model of con ‡ict and appropriation where players are partitioned in groups and can engage into appropriation both against the other groups and within their own group. We distinguish between a technology of external con ‡ict, which describes how easy or di¢ cult it is to take from the other groups, and a technology of internal con ‡ict, which describes the possibilities for appropriation within groups. These technologies may di¤er because both the weapons used in the two types of con ‡icts as well as the institutions for con ‡ict resolution di¤er.
In the basic model individual players decide simultaneously and independently about internal con ‡ict, external con ‡ict and production. We show that with a logistic technology of con ‡ict, there is an extreme form of the 'group cohesion e¤ect'that internal and external con ‡ict are negatively correlated. Generically, there is only internal con ‡ict, or only external con ‡ictbut not both. Changes in the environment can switch the equilibrium from one type of con ‡ict to the other. This may contribute to an explanation of the upsurge of internal wars in the former Eastern Block after the end of the cold war.
Decisions about external con ‡ict are often taken in some political process rather than individually and independently. Thus we also study collective decisions, where groups decide about the amount of resources that each group member has to devote to the external con ‡ict before individuals choose how to allocate their remaining resources to production and internal con ‡ict.
Groups choose su¢ ciently high external con ‡ict in order to avoid internal con ‡ict. Thus, there is no internal …ghting on the equilibrium path. If property gets more insecure within groups, and hence incentives to start …ghting internally are high, this leads only to more external …ghting. That remains true even if groups cannot gain much from the other groups by …ghting against them. Thus, we propose a model of diversionary wars, which is, in contrast to the existing literature, not based on a principal agent problem.
The paper also has normative implications for the design of multi-tiered organizations like federal states or big …rms. Even when the technology of production gives no reason for dividing individuals into groups, it is optimal to do so in order to minimize unproductive con ‡ict. The optimal design of a multi-tiered organization is one where individuals are indi¤erent between putting resources in the internal or in the external con ‡ict. Thus, having both types of con ‡ict is optimal.
There are three directions for further research that we think would be particularly useful to explore. One is the targeting of external appropriation activities against speci…c groups, or of internal …ghting against single individuals. A second topic is the endogenous formation and the stability of groups. These extensions seem particularly interesting if players are asymmetric ex ante. Finally, our model is static and thus one cannot study dynamics or repeated interaction, whereas existing models of dynamic con ‡ict like Polborn (2005) and Bester and Konrad (2005) do not incorporate the distinction between internal and external con ‡ict. Studying the interrelation between the two types of con ‡icts in a dynamic setting remains an important task.
A Appendix
A.1 Log-concavity of the objective functions From (1), we have
To show that this is strictly concave in (x ik ; y ik ) look at the three terms in turn. First look at A(y ig ). Let V := P G k6 =g exp b P m j=1 y jk for notational convenience. Then
Di¤erentiating with respect to y ig ; we get
This implies A 00 (y ig ) < 0; hence A(y ig ) is strictly concave in y ig . In addition, note that A(y ig ) does not depend on x ig :
Now look at B(x ig ). For notational convenience let W := P m j6 =i exp (ax jg ).
Then
This implies B 00 (x ig ) < 0 and hence B(x ig ) is strictly concave in x ig . In addition, note that B(x ig ) does not depend on y ig :
Finally, look at C(x ig ; y ig ). By assumption, ln f (z) is strictly concave in z: This implies that
The determinant of the Hessian Matrix is zero. Thus C(x ig ; y ig ) is weakly concave in (x ig ; y ig ).
Finally, we can put things together to show that ln(u ig ) is strictly concave in (x ig ; y ig ). Write ln(u ig (x; y)) = A(x) + B(x) + C(x; y). For any (x; y); (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 R 2 + and any t 2 (0; 1) we have ln (u ig (tx + (1 t)x 0 ; ty + (1 t)y 0 )) = = A (ty + (1 t)y 0 ) + B (tx + (1 t)x 0 ) + C (tx + (1 t)x 0 ; ty + (1 t)y 0 ) < < tA(y) + (1 t)A(y 0 ) + tB(x) + (1 t)B(x 0 ) + tC(x; y) + (1 t)C(x 0 ; y 0 ) = = t ln (u ig (x; y)) + (1 t) ln (u ig (x 0 ; y 0 )) :
Hence ln (u ig (x ig ; y ig )) is strictly concave in (x ig ; y ig ).
A.2 Proof of lemma 5
Suppose to the contrary that there are two individuals in the same group who choose di¤erent amounts of internal rent seeking. Without loss of generality, suppose 0 x 1g < x 2g 1 y g :
Since x 1g < 1 y g ; from the …rst order condition for player 1 (see lines (9) and (10)), we have
On the other hand, since 0 < x 2g ; from the …rst order conditions for player 2 (lines (10) and (11)) we get
:
Putting things together, we have X j6 =1
A.3 Proof of lemma 6
Existence: The condition of the lemma (i.e. inequality (14) ) implies that the …rst order condition (9) for the case with no internal …ghting holds for all individuals. Uniqueness: Suppose there exists an equilibrium where x ig > 0 for some individual i in a group g: Then, by condition (14) of the lemma, and (13), we have @v ig @x ig < 0: This contradicts the …rst order conditions (9)- (11) . Payo¤s follow by inserting.
A.4 Proof of lemma 7
Existence: By (13), if equation (16) holds, we have @v ig @x ig = 0:
It remains to show that there exist x 1 ; :::; x G such that 0 x g 1 y g for g = 1; :::; G and such that equation (16) holds. Note that if x g = 1 y g for all g = 1; ::; G we have
On the other hand, if x g = 0 for all g = 1; ::; G we have (14), does not hold. By continuity of , there thus exist x 1 ; :::; x G such that 0 x g 1 y g for g = 1; :::; G and such that equation (16) holds. This completes the existence proof.
Uniqueness: Because of lemma 5 we only have to consider within-group symmetric equilibria. Equation (16) 
To ease notation, let X := n m G X k=1 y k 1 a m 1 m denote the right hand side of (22) . Note that X > 0 since, by assumption, (14) does not hold. Using the notation just introduced, (16) is equivalent to m P G k=1 x k = X: Moreover, by (13) , (16) is also equivalent to @v ig @x ig = 0: Suppose equation (16) does not hold. There are two possibilities. First, if m P G k=1 x k < X we have @v ig @x ig > 0 by (13) . Then the …rst order condition implies x g = 1 y g for all groups, hence m P G k=1 x k = n m P G k=1 y k > X; contradicting the assumption m P G k=1 x k < X: Second, if m P G k=1 x k > X we have @v ig @x ig < 0: Then the …rst order condition implies x g = 0 for all groups, and hence m P G k=1 x k = 0 < X; contradiction. Hence, there are no equilibria where (16) does not hold.
Payo¤s follow from inserting.
A.5 Proof of proposition 2
As argued in the main text, the fact that (17) is increasing in y g implies that there is no internal …ghting on the equilibrium path.
A.5.1 Case NO
Since (n) a (m 1) =m; inequality (14) 
by the same argument as in the proof of lemma 2.
Existence. If all groups choose y g = y given in (23) , then in stage 2 x ig = 0 for all i and g. Fix all y 2 = ::: = y G = y and think of u i1 as a function of y 1 : Choosing a y 1 < y leads to internal con ‡ict in stage 2, and is thus never optimal -in this range u i1 is strictly increasing in y 1 (see line (17) in lemma 7). On the other hand, if y 1 2 [y; 1] there is no internal …ghting. In this range, the objective function u i1 is u i1 = exp (bmy 1 ) exp (bmy 1 ) + (G 1) exp (bmy) 1 m f (n (G 1) my my 1 ) (24) (see line (15) ). We will show that u i1 is strictly decreasing in y 1 for all y 1 > y: From (24), @u i1 @y 1 < 0 i¤ b (G 1) exp (bmy) exp (bmy 1 ) + (G 1) exp (bmy) < (n (G 1) my my 1 ) :
For all y 1 > y; b (G 1) exp (bmy) exp (bmy 1 ) + (G 1) exp (bmy) < b G 1 G < a m 1 m < (n (G 1) my my 1 )
where the second inequality is from (INTRA), and the third inequality is from equation (18), y 1 > y and 0 < 0: Hence for all y 1 > y; u i1 is strictly decreasing in y 1 , and group 1 has no incentive to increase y 1 over y:
Uniqueness. Here we argue that there is no symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium where y is not as given by (23) . Suppose y < 1 1 n 1 a (m 1) m :
Then we have internal …ghting, contradiction. On the other hand, suppose y > 1 1 n 1 a (m 1) m :
Then we have (n (1 y)) > a m 1 m > b G 1 G . Hence each group would gain from choosing a slightly lower y g -this still leads to zero internal con ‡ict in the second stage, and the lower share of group g is outweighed by the corresponding increase in output.
A.5.3 Case INTER
Existence. As in lemma 3, equation (7) de…nes a unique y 2 (0; 1). If y 1 = ::: = y G = y then we have x ig = 0 for all i and g: Fix all y g = y; g = 2; :::; G and think of u i1 as a function of y 1 : Choosing a y 1 such that there is internal …ghting can never be optimal. On the other hand, among the range where there is no internal …ghting, u ig is a concavi…able objective function to be maximized over a convex set, and at the proposed value the derivative of the objective function is zero.
Uniqueness. Here we argue that there is no symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium where y is not given by equation (7) . Suppose that
Then each group would pro…t from increasing y g :
On the other hand, if y > 1 1 n 1 b G 1 G each group would pro…t from decreasing its y g :
